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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
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PL . \IXTIFFS' PE·TITION FOR REHE·ARING
~\XD BRIEF I~ SUPP'ORT· THEREOF·

Plaintiffs petition the Court for rehearing and rearguiuent of the above case upon the following grounds:
POINT I
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT \YITH ITS DECISIONS OF 1962 AND EARLIER CPO~ THE QUESTION OF WHICH EMPLOYER
IS LIABLE FOR .AGGRAVATION OF A PREVIOUS
IX JURY.
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POINT II
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ITS LONG-ESTABLISHED DECISIONAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO INVOKE
CONTINUING JURISDICTION AND THE DECISION
THUS CASTS DOUBT ON THE MEANING OF THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE.

WHEREFOR.E, plaintiffs pray that the judgment
and opinion of the 'Court be recalled and a reargument
be permitted upon the points herein set forth.
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.

JOHN H. SNOW
701 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs

John H. Sno\\'" hereby certifies that he is attorney
for plaintiffs, that there is good cause to believe the
decision of the court is erroneous and that the case should
he reheard and reargued, as prayed in said petition.
DATE.D this lOth day of March, 1965.

JOHN H. SNOW
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BRIEF

I~

SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ITS DECISIONS OF 1962 AND EARLIER UPON THE QUESTION OF WHICH EMPLOYER
IS LIABLE FOR AGGRAVATION OF A PREVIOUS
INJURY.

Although each of the parties in this case suggested
or urged, in printed briefs and upon oral argument, the
applicability of the 1962 decision of this ·Court in Makoff
Con1pany v. Industrial Co1nmission, 13 U. 2d 23, 368
P.~d 70, the Court's opinion did not even mention tha.t
d~ri~ion or the applicable principle for which it stands.
That principle, so firmly established that this Court
stated in 1929 it ""as "no longer an open question in this
state'' (Gray bar Electric Co. v. Industrial Commission,
73lr. 5()S. :27() P. 161) has now been weakened, though perhaps unintentionally, by the decision of the Court in the
prPst\nt case.
The J/akoff decision was but the latest in a long line
of ease~ holding, so far as applicable here, that an aggravation of a previous injury is compensable and that reg-ardlP~s of the identity of the employer at the tilne of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the first injury, the employer at the time of the aggravation is the responsible employer.
In the decision here under attack, the Court fastens
liability upon the employer at the time of the first injury, exonerates the employer at the time of the second
of two aggravations and totally ignores the employer at
the time of the first aggravation (Iverson), who had paid
compensation to the applicant, through the State Insurance Fund, for such first aggravation.
A comparison between the facts of the present case
and the facts of M akoff will demonstrate that the decisions in the two cases are in direct conflict.
In Makoff the applicant had been injured in 1955
while employed by a stranger to the Makoff case. In
1957, while working for ~Iakoff, he slipped on a stairway
and sustained injury whirh the medical panel concluded
"was an episode in a progressive back disorder." Later
an incident occurred away from work at ,,,.hich time the
1957 injury "ripened'' into a compensable disability.
On these facts, this Court, speaking through Justice
McDonough, stated:
" ... under our aggravation cases "\Yhether he
was employed by someone else in 1!155 "\Yould make
no difference in result. The en1ployment by plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tiffs (~la.koff) in 1957, "·hen his initial injury
\\·a.H

nggravatPd,

iH

of prilnary importance here."

~lnkoff

"·as held responsihlP for the eompensation due
for thP diHahility.
In thP presPnt case the applicant was injured while
\\·orking for plaintiffs in 1958. (Plaintiffs therefore are
in thP position of thP stranger in M akoff.) He was
found hy the 1Comn1ission to have a 5% permanent disability for \Yhich he 'vas paid con1pensation by plaintiffs,
pur~uant to the order of the ·Commision. In June, 1960,
\vhile etnployed by Iverson he sustained a further injury
to his baek and applied for compensation for the injuries
thn~ sustained, and the State Insurance Fund paid benefit~ as rotnpenRation for the IverRon injury.
In 1962, \vhile e1nployed by Wasatch, he had a furthf'r injury and the chairman of the medical panel, as
\ra~ pointed out by the Court in its decision, stated that
his haek "·as undergoing "a degenerative process that
has been slowly progressing.'' This \vas just as the
ll:tnel found in Jl ako.f_f.
In the present case, as in ill nkoff, the subsequent
epi~odes ag-g-ravated the condition "~hich had developed
follo\\·in~ the first injury. As the chainnan of the medical panel te~tified (R. 105 ), each of the accidents sustaint·d hy the applicant cauRed a \vorsening of the pro.!!rt\~~ivP de~enerative proress.
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As should be clear from the foregoing, Makoff,
which was found liable, occupied the identical position
as Wasatch occupies in the present case, or as Iverson
would have occupied had he been brought into the case
as a party, but at that point the similarity between the
cases ends because the court found Makoff liable but no\r
finds Wasatch not liable.
It is submitted that if there are two applicants, each
with a progressive degenerating process in the back \Yhich
is injured and each suffers a subsequent injury which
worsens the condition and the court in one case determines that the subsequent employer is liable, as it has
always previously held, there can be neither reason,
consistency, nor justice in a later holding, without explanation, that the subsequent employer is not liable.
If the present decision stands, there can be no meaning to the proposition, often stated by this Court, that
"no standard of health or physical fitness for an employment is prescribed by our statute to entitle an employee to compensation for an injury arising by accident
out of or in the course of his employment. Apparently
when one enters an employment, the employer takes the
employee as he is." (Emphasis added.) Spencer v. Industrial Commission (1935), 87 lT. 336, 40 P.2d 188.

Any other polie:v would impose a heavy burden upon
all '~first-injury employers," particularly where, as in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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this rn~P, the injured employee ('vhose compensation case
i=' thought to hP closPd) then ":orks for at least four
~ub~PqUPnt entployPrs, sustains injuries while working
for tw·o of the four, and a period of more than five
yPar~ Plap~r~ het"·ppn the first injury and notice of
hPn.ring on thP last injury.
II Pre, during tnost of the period of more than five
year~ aftPr the applicant's original injury, plaintiffs had
no a~~oeiation "rith him, kne'v nothing of him, received
no notieP about hitn and, of course, could make no invt\~tigation concerning him. Neither could plaintiffs offer
early 1nedical treatment which might have reduced the
ulthnate disabili t~'".
These facts demonstrate the wisdom of those previous decisions holding the subsequent employer, the "employer at aggravation," liable for aggravations of
previous disabilities and holding that such subsequent
employ(:\rs take he1nployees as they find them."
Employees are not the only ones to be considered
in cases arising under the Act. lT nder various sections
of the .A. ct, employers also have rights and these include,
n~ this Court has said, the right to know the facts
protnptly~ so there 'vill be the "opportunity of giving
protnpt and proper medical aid" and the right to "prot~rt ~nlployPr~ against fraudulent claims." Salt Lake
City r. lndu:'trial Connnission, (1943), 104 U. 436, 140
.P.2d t}-t-1-.
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By use of this quotation, we do not mean to imply
this claim is fraudulent. But, since decisions of this
·Court govern all claims, whether litigated or not, its
holdings should furnish guidelines as consistent as justice and the judicial process can produce. The decision
in this case does not.
POINT II
THE COURT'S DECISION IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ITS LONG-ESTABLISHED DECISIONAL STANDARDS GOVERNING THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO INVOKE
·CONTINUIN·G JURISDICTION AND THE DECISION
THUS CASTS DOUBT ON THE MEANING OF THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE.

The Commission's power of continuing jurisdiction
is found in Section 35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953. Heretofore,
this ~Court has consistently held that the power "to make
such modification or change 'vith respect to former findings, or orders with respect thereto," as provided by
the statute, cannot be exercised by the Commission \\rithout a sho,ving of ~'good cause," "Thich 1neans that there
is "some change or neuJ development in the inj1Jry complained of not kno"\\rn to the parties "Then thP formrr
award is rnadP." Salt Lake City

t,·.

Tndustrial Connnission

(1923), 61 lT. 514, 215 Jl. 10-t-7: Aetna Life l11s. Co. v.
Tnrlnstr~ial Cnnnnissinn (1929), 73

TT. 366, 274 P. 139.
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Contint'nlal Cas1H1lty Co. 'l'. Industrial Commission
(1~)~7), 70 lT. 35-l, 260 P. 279: Carter v. Industrial Com·ntissiou (1930), 7() lT. ;)~(), 290 P. 776 (emphasis added).

'ThP present decision appears, at first glance, to hold
the sante but \vhen the facts of this case are examined,
it is <'IPar the ~Court has approved a course of conduct
hy the Commission that is at complete variance with the
long--Pstablished standards governing the power of continning jurisdirtion.
First, the applicant never had any intention of claiming-, and does not no\v claim, there was a "change or new
dPveloptnent'' in thP o rigi unl injury. Thus, he made no
attetnpt to sho\v "good cause'' and no notice of a claimed
r~opening

of his ease against plaintiffs was ever given,

hPeause he did not RP~k it nor did his counsel.
~eeond,

the only parties clall:ning this "change 1n

original injury" are those who "'ould escape their own
rPspon~ibility by doing so - "\V- a.satch and the State
1nsuranee Fund.

T1t ird, PYen the Indu~trial Commission has not contPnded it "·a~ reopening the former case. Just the oppo~ite i~ true, as is shown by Chairman Wiesley's statement
(B. 1~~) :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Now if an application was- on file within
the three-year limit, then the applicant could reopen that by filing an application for further and
additional compensation, because of the continuing
jurisdiction section of the statute. Which (sic)
I can't consider this procedure as an application
for further and additional compensation under
that case."
Fourth, the applicant's application was filed in February, 1963 and notice of hearing was sent to plaintiffs
in October, 1963, nearly eight months later, even though
there had been proceedings in the meantime and even
though nearly 11 months had elapsed since the Wasatch
accident - 11 months of precious investigative time
which was denied to plaintiffs. This never-to-be-regained
investigative opportunity now looms particularly large
since W asa.tch claims (as shown in its brief, p. 15) that
the applicant "did not sustain an aecident" when he
"Tas injured on its job.
Fifth, the notice did not state "the objective of the
proceedings," nor did it show ''the nature and character
of the relief sought" or the party seeking it. 'These
have been minimal due process requirements for more
than -t-0 year~. Spring Canyon Coal

ro.

v. Industrial

Comm,ission (1922), 60 l .... 533, 210 P. ()11. If this requireinent had heen 1net, plaintiffs "Tould have had notice
that their true antagonist 'Yas \\. . asatch and they could
have prepared their

defense~

accordingly.
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ThP~P

practicPR and procPdures cannot be sustained
hv. 8tatutP or hv. dPei~ional standards set by this Court
~inre thP statutP \\·aH enacted, yet the present decision
~PPtn~ to approve them and most certainly will be cited
in thP future as doing so, if it is not recalled.
.A dPcision which approves these methods and practieP~,

\vhieh allo,vs subsequent employers to escape their
obviou~ responsibility, which permits such employers to
ntake un\\·itting etnployees mere pawns in a contest beh,·een en1ployers, is a decision which should not be allo\Vflrl to Rtanrl.
If these methods and practices of the 'Commision
are not disapproved, what is to prevent the 'Commission
frotn conducting similar proceedings in other cases of
~urrPs~ivP injuries? This invites the very evil this ·c·ourt
had in mind "·hen it said, in 1923, that permitting these
pra('t irr~ H"·ould invite endless litigation in this class
of ea.s(\~." j._~alt Lake City v. Industrial Commission,
{ 19~3) 61 tT. :l14, :215 P. 1047.

This Court has always construed the vV orkmen's
Cotnpensation Act liberally "with the purpose of effPrtuating its beneficent and humane objects." North
Beck ]fining Co. v. Indu.strial Commission (1921), 58 U.
486. 200 P. 111. It is, therefore, particularly ironic that
this applicant, ""'ho has not once in this case sought reli~f against thPse plaintiffs, now finds himself, more than
tw·o years after his application against Wasatch, still
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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awaiting surgery on his back. As he pointed out in his
brief (P·. 5), Wasatch and the State Fund "are the ones
who urged the Commission to relate this causal connection back to the Mollerup employment injury in 1958."
CON:CLUSION
The decision creates unnecesary conflicts with earlier cases involving aggravation and approves practices
and procedures which violate basic statutory and decisional standards governing exercise of the power of continuing jurisdiction.
Precedent need not be followed, merely for the sake
of consistency, if it is concluded that the reason for the
standards of the earlier cases is no longer valid. No such
conclusion was announced by the Court in this decision
and none can be inferred from the decision.
The effects of this decision upon those who must
conduct their affairs within the framework of the Act
and its administration are widespread and deletorious.
The ~c·ourt should recall the decision, order reargument
of the case and, in such event, reverse the order of the
Commission under appropriate instructions to prevent
such occurrences in the future.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. SNOW
Attorney for Plaintiffs
701 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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